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In the presence of the underground economy taxes give rise to a deadweight loss from displacement of 
efficient producers by inefficient producers. We consider an economy in which a producer faces two types 
of costs: the cost of production, and taxes. If the ability to evade taxes is inversely proportional to the ability 
to keep production costs down, high tax rates may cause inefficient producers to crowd out efficient 
producers. We estimate this deadweight loss from surveys of 426 Czech firms taken in 2004 and 2005. We 
find that the deadweight loss due to this crowding out can be several times as large as the triangle 
deadweight losses from discouraged consumption. Our paper provides the first estimates ever of the 
displacement loss from tax evasion. 
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Shell Brasil, the Brazilian subsidiary of the Anglo-Dutch oil group, is to sell 285 service 
stations and six fuel deposits to Agip do Brasil, the local subsidiary of Eni, the Italian 
group. Shell said the move was part of efforts to concentrate on the most profitable parts of 
its business in Brazil, but it is understood to have sold the stations, in remote central and 
western regions of the country, after failing to compete with smaller distributors 
undercutting bigger companies by evading taxes.  
Financial Times of London, February 25, 2000, page 18 
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1. Introduction 
The present paper seeks to estimate the deadweight loss from the displacement of efficient 
producers by efficient tax evaders by using surveys of 426 Czech firms taken in 2004 and 2005. 
Uneven enforcement of taxes creates an uneven playing field on which inefficient producers with a 
willingness and ability to evade taxes can oust honest, efficient producers from the market. The 
difference between the costs of the surviving evaders, and what costs would have been without 
evasion, is the displacement deadweight loss from tax evasion.  
 
Displacement deadweight loss arises from, but should not be confused with the displacement of 
resources that arises when a government intervention eliminates an economic actor and replaces 
him with a similar actor. Most research into what is commonly understood as displacement, of 
which Dahlberg and Forslund (2005) is a representative example, has focused on the question of 
whether wage subsidies create employment or whether they simply replace non-subsidized labour 
by subsidized labour. Research has also focused on how subsidies to firms allow one firm to 
displace the other, but with the exception of perhaps Usher (1975, 1983), research has focused on 
how to measure the amount of displacement rather than on measuring the social cost of this 
displacement. In the field of taxes almost no research exists on how tax evasion leads to 
displacement, nor of the cost of such displacement. Vito Tanzi (1982, p.88) is one of the few 
economists to have noticed that "untaxed underground activities will compete with taxed, legal 
ones and will succeed in attracting resources even though these activities may be less 
productive...There will of course be significant welfare losses associated with this transfer." 
Jonathan Kesselman (1997, p.300) made a related point:  "If pure tax evasion is concentrated in 
particular industries or sectors it will raise net returns from activities in those sectors, and this will 
in turn tend to expand those sectors and their products as against the efficient pattern arising with 
uniform compliance."  
 
The lack of interest economists have show in the displacement deadweight loss from taxes may be 
due in part to the large number of  competing ideas about the deadweight losses that arise from tax 
evasion. Each one of these ideas has important policy implications and has attracted the interests of 
a growing number of researchers. The most prominent concern about tax evasion is the extent to 
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which it narrows the tax base. A small tax base forces a few people to carry a large burden of 
financing public goods. Browning (1976) called the weight of this burden the social cost of public 
funds and emphasized that progressively smaller tax bases produce exponentially rising social 
costs of public funds and government underinvestment in public goods. With these ideas in mind 
Loayaza (1996) modeled the underground economy and found that it could reduce economic 
growth if this economy reduced the availability of public services to all. Alm (1985) saw the main 
cost of the tax evasion as being the fact that the absence of tax in the underground economy drives 
a wedge between the marginal product of labour in the underground economy and the marginal 
product of the same labour in the taxed economy. This wedge means that society’s overall product 
would be higher if labour moved back to the taxed economy. Alm estimated losses as high as nine 
percent of the US economy. Usher (1986) has pointed out that another social cost of tax evasion is 
the value of the effort people put into concealing their incomes. Cremer and Gahvari (2000) have 
warned that a state may secretly compete for the tax base of its neighbour by going soft on tax 
evaders. These authors worry that the “mobility of tax bases between lower level jurisdictions, 
creates a potential for an efficiency loss due to non-cooperative tax setting” and argue for 
coordinated tax auditing policies between states and within federal states. More recently Bayer 
(2006) has examined how enforcement costs vary with tax rates by modeling tax evasion as a 
“concealment-detection contest” between the taxpayers and the authorities. He showed through 
simulations that “higher tax rates cause more evasion and increase the resources wasted in the 
contest.” Spiro (2005) provides a recent survey of the literature on the efficiency costs of tax 
evasion. The bibliographies of these researches contain references to studies with similar 
objectives, but only Spiro (2005) contains a reference to displacement deadweight loss.  
 
Whether the idea of displacement deadweight loss can find its place among the ideas mentioned 
above may depend on the answers to three empirical questions which we make the subject of the 
present paper: 
 
1) The opinion firms hold of competitors who evade tax. Anecdotes abound about how large, well-
established firms who pay their taxes lobby governments to make smaller firms pay their due. Tax 
officials explained to one of the authors that in the Canadian province of Quebec during the 1990’s 
hotel chains demanded that government force bed and breakfasts, hostels, and “villages d’accœuil” 
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(rural villages that welcome tour groups into their homes) to stop evading taxes because such 
evasion was eroding hotel chain business.  The present paper goes beyond anecdotes and asks a 
representative sample of firms questions structured to discover whether displacement loss is a 
phenomenon about which policy makers should worry. We find, in support of the importance of 
importance of displacement deadweight loss, that a majority of firms believes that tax evaders pose 
a threat to the existence of honest firms and that evaders tend to be less efficient than honest firms.  
 
2) The correlation between a firm’s tax-honesty and its productivity. Palda (1998, 2001a, 2001b) 
examined the theoretical circumstances under which a displacement loss from uneven enforcement 
of taxes arises. The amount of loss depends on how closely tied are a firm's productive efficiency 
and tax-honesty. If efficient producers are honest taxpayers and inefficient producers are dishonest, 
then a rise in taxes creates a climate that favors the survival of tax evaders above the survival of 
firms with low production costs. Using a simple model of profit maximizing firms he showed how 
displacement losses from the tax tend to rise as the correlation between honesty and efficiency 
rises. Significant displacement deadweight can exist even when there is no correlation between 
honesty and efficiency. Only in the case where there is a perfect negative correlation between the 
efficiency of a firm and its tax-honesty did Palda find an absence of displacement deadweight loss. 
Guided by Palda’s model, we use our firm surveys to calculate correlation of between 0.1368 and 
0.1673, which suggest that significant displacement deadweight loss may plague certain sectors of 
the Czech economy.  
 
3) Is displacement deadweight a phenomenon of comparable importance to, say, Alm’s (1985) 
deadweight loss from evasion? Alm found deadweight losses of 9% for the US. We estimate, 
under highly stylized assumptions about production functions and tax schedules, that displacement 
deadweight losses can be in the neighborhood of 2.7% to 13.1% of industry costs.  
 
We emphasize that even though this paper analyses data, it does not test a hypothesis. We follow 
the research agenda started by Harberger (1964) of building a model of deadweight loss, and of 
using data about the economy to calculate the parameters that belong in the model. We load these 
parameters into a model to produce estimates of deadweight loss. These estimates will only be as 
good as the model and the quality of the data used to flesh out the model. In this paper we take 
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pains to examine both the quality of our model and of our data in judging whether displacement 
deadweight loss is a phenomenon worthy of further study.  
 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section two explains the notion of displacement deadweight 
loss. Section three describes our firm survey and explains how the results of the survey support the 
notion that displacement loss exists and might be large enough to merit further study. Section four 
uses our firm survey to produce calculate the correlation between productive efficiency and tax 
honesty. Section five suggests how to measure displacement deadweight loss and provides 
estimates based on our survey. Section six points out where the present research needs to be 
deepened.  
 
2. What is displacement deadweight loss?   
Displacement deadweight loss arises because by virtue of their ability or willingness to evade taxes 
some firms with high production costs oust from the market firms with low production costs. The 
difference between actual industry production costs and what those costs would have been if only 
the most efficient producers had survived is displacement deadweight loss (which we will call 
DDL). In earlier work cited above, Palda gave precision to the above notion by modeling firm 
competition in the presence of two characteristics that “code” for survival. The two characteristics 
he considered are efficiency in production and tax-honesty. Two parameter survival models in 
economics are common, but Palda’s was the first two parameter survival model where one 
parameter is socially productive while the other may be destructive. From the opposite social 
usefulness of each factor arises the potential for a DDL.  
 
DDL would not be a topic of interest to researchers if the most efficient producers were also the 
most active tax evaders. In such a case an inefficient producer would not have the tax evading 
advantage that would allow him to oust a more efficient producer. Put differently, when productive 
efficiency and tax honesty are perfectly negatively correlated, DDL is zero. DDL arises when 
productive efficiency and tax honesty are not perfectly negatively correlated. Consider the story a 
flower merchant from the Czech Republic told us. This merchant would import flowers from 
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Holland in refrigerated truck and pay full duty at the Czech border. Some of his competitors would 
bring flowers back from Holland undeclared and concealed in the unrefrigerated trunks of their 
car. His competitors were willing to let half their flowers wilt to evade taxes because such a 
maneuver gave them a cost advantage over him. While his production costs were lower (lower 
wastage of flowers) his overall tax and production costs were higher and he was being edged out of 
the market. The difference between the production costs of the tax evaders and what costs would 
have been had the honest merchant been the sole supplier is the DDL.  
 
Palda found through simulations that, over a broad range of correlations, DDL falls as the 
correlation between tax honesty and productive efficiency rises. Put differently, if many efficient 
producers also pay much of their tax they will be prey to inefficient producers who pay little of 
their tax. Palda was surprised to make prominent measure of DDL even when productive 
efficiency and tax honesty were uncorrelated. He explained this by pointing out that in the 
uncorrelated case a producer is as likely to be efficient and honest as inefficient and dishonest and 
that some cases will arise where a producer’s lack of honesty allows him to overcome his lack of 
efficiency and oust a more efficient but more honest rival. Palda could not generalize his results, as 
they arose from simulations based on the assumption that efficiency and honesty are either 
uniformly distributed or joint-normally distributed, and on assumptions of a Cobb-Douglass 
production function. For the present research Palda’s results suggests we should be on the lookout 
for a correlation between efficiency and honesty that is greater than -1. A correlation in the 
neighborhood of zero or greater may suggest, but by itself not prove, the existence of a large DDL.  
 
3. The Firm Survey   
The previous section suggests that the correlation between productive efficiency and honesty is the 
key variable of interest to those interested in the potential existence of DDL. Measuring such a 
correlation is not at first an obvious exercise and in this section we work towards such a measure 
by first getting some idea of the spread of efficiency and honesty and of whether firms believe 
displacement to be a competitive threat.  
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Table 1: Those Who Answered our Survey 
Working position Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Company owner 305 71.6% 71.6% 
Director of the company/division 17 4.0% 75.6% 
Manager with subordinate departments 104 24.4% 100.0% 
TOTAL 426 100.0%   
 
We begin with some simple questions we posed to firms about their beliefs concerning evasion and 
efficiency in their industry. Our data on firms come from combined 2004 and 2005 surveys of 107 
and 319 Czech firms, respectively. These firms were drawn from retail (220 firms) and 
construction (206 firms). Respondents were of three kinds as summarized in Table 1. The large 
percentage of respondents who were company owners gives us confidence that our survey will 
pick up the best available knowledge about the underground economy facing the firms 
interviewed.  
 
Table 2: Spread of Productive Efficiency of Firms 
Question: “How big are the differences in productivity of companies in your line of business?” 
 
Differences in productivity Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Very big 46 10.8 10.8% 
Rather big 123 28.9 39.7% 
Big 81 19.0 58.7% 
Rather small 126 29.6 88.3% 
Small 50 11.7 100.0% 
TOTAL 426 100.0  
 
 
Table 2 indicates that 58.7% of respondents believed there was a large spread in productivity. 
Displacement deadweight loss cannot arise without a spread in productive talents and the larger the 
spread, there greater is the potential for DDL.  
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Table 3: Efficiency in Production vs. Firm Size 
Question: “Which companies tend to evade paying taxes?” 
Which companies evade taxes, by 
number of employees (2005) 
Agree 
(percent) 
Disagree 
(percent) 
Confident interval for 
Percent of evading 
More than 100 employees 57.7 42.3 (26.8  33.9) 
50-99 employees 57.4 42.6 (23.4  29.4) 
6-49 employees 52.3 47.7 (22.3  28.0) 
Less than 5 employees 48 52 (24.9  31.6) 
Only 1 employee 51.4 48.6 (28.1  35.2) 
TOTAL number of firms 319 100  
 
A common belief among those who believe in displacement deadweight loss is that small firms are 
inefficient and resort to tax evasion to out-compete large firms. Table 3 gives mixed support to this 
notion. Small firms do not seem more likely to evade than large firms. In fact, there is a bias in 
Table 3 towards the argument that large firms are the biggest evaders. The questions we posed 
were not subtle enough to discern what percentage of its revenues a firm evaded, so we must 
regard cautiously the figures in Table 3. Note that the total number of firms in Table 3 is 319 
because Table 3 is based only on the 2005 survey. We did not include the 2004 survey in Table 3 
because then we asked a similar, but poorly worded question.  
 
Table 4: Are Evading Firms a Threat to Honest Firms? 
Question: “Do you agree with the opinion that companies that evade paying taxes threat your 
business?” 
Are evading firms a threat to honest firms? Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Definitely agree 183 43.0 43.0 
Rather agree 118 27.7 70.7 
Neither agree nor disagree 31 7.3 77.9 
Rather disagree 69 16.2 94.1 
Definitely disagree 25 5.9 100.0 
TOTAL 426 100 
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Table 4 presents evidence on why firms fear tax evasion by their rivals. Fully 70.7 of firms 
believed that firms that evade taxes are a threat to their existence. Table 4 gives support to the 
notion that tax evasion is a threat to the survival of most firms.  
Table 5: Do Companies Evade Taxes to Survive? 
Question: “Do you think that companies try to evade paying taxes because in case they pay taxes 
in full firms will not survive?” 
 
Do companies evade saxes to survive? Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Definitely yes 143 33.6 33.6 
Rather yes 161 37.8 71.4 
Rather no 87 20.4 91.8 
Definitely no 35 8.2 100.0 
TOTAL 426 100.0  
 
Table 5 may hint that inefficient firms are the most frequent tax evaders as 71,4% of respondents 
believed evasion is a method of survival in the market.   
 
Table 6a: Is There a Relation Between Productive Efficiency and Evasive Ability? 
Question: “Is there any relation between tax evasion and efficiency of the company?” 
 
Relationship between evasion and efficiency Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Definitely yes 102 23.9 23.9% 
Rather yes 174 40.8 64.8% 
Rather no 117 27.5 92.3% 
Definitely no 33 7.7 100.0% 
TOTAL 426 100   
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Table 6b: What is the Extent of the Relation between Productive Efficiency and Evasive Ability? 
Question: “What is the relation between evasion of paying taxes and efficiency of the company?” 
 
Relation between tax evasion and efficiency Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Definitely positive 44 10.3 10.3% 
Rather positive 96 22.5 32.9% 
Rather negative 101 23.7 56.6% 
Definitely negative 35 8.2 64.8% 
I do not know 150 35.2 100.0% 
TOTAL 426 64.8  
 
Tables 6a and 6b give a more precise sense of the possible correlation between tax-honesty and 
efficiency than do the tables that precede them. Table 6a suggests that 64.8% of firms believe that 
tax evasion and productive efficiency are related. Just what this relation might be though seems 
hard to infer from Table 6b which suggest that as many believe the relation between efficiency and 
tax-honesty to be positive and those who believe the relation to be negative. 
 
Tables 1-5 tend to give support to the notion that displacement deadweight loss is a phenomenon 
of concern to firms in the Czech Republic. Tables 6(a) and 6(b) frustrate our attempts to get a clear 
idea of what is the correlation between tax honesty and efficiency. DDL falls as this correlation 
falls (though DDL does not disappear completely, according to theoretical results, until the 
correlation is -1), so a precise idea of the correlation would help us decide whether policy makers 
should worry about DDL.  
 
4. Calculating the correlation between efficiency and honesty   
Up to this point we have loosely spoken of a firm’s productive efficiency and tax honesty. To 
calculate the correlation between productive efficiency and tax honesty we need to sharpen our 
definition of these two quantities and explain how each firm becomes endowed with them.   
 
Think of producers as being infinite in number and indexed by A. A is a productivity parameter 
that differs from firm to firm. Each firm is also given a different index i which is an honesty 
parameter. A high i signifies the firm pays most of its taxes. Nature grants each firm its A and i by 
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drawing from a distribution f(A, i) in a Cartesian coordinate system where both A and i span  [0,1]. 
Later we explain how this formulation of a firm’s efficiency and honesty can be used to calculate 
DDL. For the moment we wish to focus on calculating the correlation between honesty and 
efficiency.  For the moment we also put away explaining where the honesty parameter comes 
from.  
 
To calculate this correlation we need to know the joint distribution of A and i. To get an idea of the 
joint distribution of evasive and productive abilities we asked firms their opinions. We presented 
each firm with a five-by-five matrix with evasive ability on one axis and productive ability on the 
other axis. We asked each firm to state what percentage of firms in their industry they believed fell 
into each of the twenty-five cells of the evasion-productivity matrix. As mentioned earlier, our data 
on firms come from a combined 2004 and 2005 surveys of 107 and 319 Czech firms, respectively. 
These firms were drawn from retail (220 firms) and construction (202 firms).  
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of firm answers weighted to achieve representativeness. The 
answers of each firm were forced to sum to 100% by a Java™ algorithm. Firms answered the 
question on the joint distribution of evasive and productive abilities by entering an internet site that 
forced their answers to sum to one by not allowing respondents to finish until their answers 
summed to one. The algorithm designed to achieve such consistency was devised specifically for 
the purposes of this study by the Czech survey firm Median.  
 
A quick glance at Figures 1(b) and 1(c) suggests that firm opinions about the underground 
economy are similar in the construction and the retail sectors. We carried out a chi-square test of 
homogeneity of distributions and did not reject (p-value=0.66) at convention levels the hypothesis 
that the two distributions are the same. The results of the chi-square test led us to pool firm 
answers from both construction and retail sectors. The pooled data can be seen in Figure 7(a) and it 
is these data we use in calculating the correlation between efficiency and honesty, as well as in our 
later calculations of DDL.  
 
We tested whether the distributions were uniform and whether efficiency and honesty were 
statistically independent. A positive answer to either or both of these questions could indicate that 
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respondents filled out their matrices randomly, due perhaps to “answer fatigue.” Using a Pearson 
Chi-square test we rejected with P values below 0.0001 the hypothesis that A and i are statistically 
independent. We also rejected with similar confidence the hypothesis that the joint distribution of 
A and i is uniform and symmetric. We conclude that our respondents did not fill out the A-i matrix 
randomly. 
 
Figure 1: Joint Distribution of Firm Evasive and Productive Abilities (all firms) 
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Of the available measures of correlation in ordinal data we chose the most common: Spearman’s 
rank correlation coefficient and Kendall’s tau rank correlation coefficient. Spearman’s coefficient 
was 0.1673 and was significantly different from zero. Kendall’s tau-a coefficient (which makes no 
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adjustment for ties in the cross-tabulation) was 0.1067 and the tau-b coefficient (which makes 
adjustments for ties and is best suited to square cross-tabulations) was 0.1368 with both being 
significantly different from zero.  
 
In Palda’s simulations, even a zero correlation between honesty and efficiency produced 
significant DDL. A positive correlation between efficiency and honesty produced even more DDL. 
Our calculated correlations suggest that DDL may be a significant problem in the certain sectors of 
the Czech economy.  
 
5. An estimate of displacement deadweight loss   
To measure displacement deadweight loss we need to know what are the costs of firm production 
under tax evasion and then to compare this cost to what costs would be if firms did not evade 
taxes2. In a market where firms either survive or perish, the exercise of measuring DDL is to first 
identify the firms who produce under evasion, the amount they produce, and measure their 
production costs. The second step is to identify who would be the most efficient firms to produce 
the quantity produced under evasion, and to measure their production costs. DDL is the difference 
in the costs of production of the two groups of firms. If both groups of firms are identical to each 
other then no DDL arises. The less overlap there is between the two groups of firms, the greater is 
DDL. The whole trick to measuring DDL is to identify the two groups of firms and then compare 
their costs.  
 
To identify firms who survive from the set of all possible firms we specify a criterion for survival. 
We assume a firm survives if its costs are inferior to price. Assume all firms have the same 
perceived cost function C(A, iT) where iT are taxes paid (the firm pays a percentage i of its taxes 
T). We say perceived costs because the firm counts not only production costs, but taxes as a part of 
costs. Palda used the following cost function (which arises from a Cobb-Douglass production 
function with constant returns to scale, a factor tax T, and wages and rents equal to 0.5) in his firm 
survival criterion: 
                                                 
2 For a more technical exposition of theory behind the measurement of DDL please see  Palda (2001b) at 
http://ideas.repec.org/p/wpa/wuwppe/0111006.html 
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A
iTC += 1    (1) 
Equation (1) shows the costs a firm perceives. Its true production costs, which are the key to 
calculating DDL, are 1/A.  
 
A firm survives if its perceived cost C is below price P. Cost less than price means that (using 
equation 1), a firm survives if its efficiency parameter A satisfies the following condition: 
 
P
iTA +≥ 1    (2) 
 
Equation (2) is a line which divides those firms who survive from those that do not survive. We 
show equation (2) in two perspectives. The first perspective is in Figure (2)  
 
Figure 2: A Bird’s-eye view of firm survival 
 
If (1+T)/P>1 then firms with the combinations of productivity parameter A and evasion parameter 
i in the shaded area 1, are those firms who produce. If (1+T)/P< 1 firms in the area 1 and 2 
produce. Figure (2) is a bird’s-eye view of the efficiency-honesty matrix that firm’s in our survey 
filled-out and which we saw in three dimensions in Figures 1(a)-(c).  
P
T+1
111 <++=
P
Tfor
P
iTA
P
1
A
i
1 2
111 >++=
P
Tfor
P
iTA
 15
Figure 3: A three-dimensional view of firm survival 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure (3) adds to Figure (2) a distribution function of firms and a cost of production function 1/A 
that falls out of the Cobb-Douglas production function under assumptions stated earlier. This cost 
of production is the curved plane that slopes down as A rises. The distribution function is the hump 
in the middle of the graph. We chose a normal distribution function for reasons of exposition. The 
straight plane that cuts through the distribution is the survival condition represented in equation 
(2). Firms to the right of the straight plane are those with the combinations of A and i necessary to 
survive given taxes and prices. Total industry production cost is the height of the sum of costs 
weighted by frequency to the right of the straight plane. Displacement losses are these costs less 
the least possible costs of producing industry output. 
 
The above paragraph gives us the three ingredients we need to calculate DDL: 
 
1) A distribution function of firms in efficiency-honesty (A, i) space. 
2) A survival criterion; the line A=(1+iT)/P. 
3) A cost function, which in our case we chose as 1/A. 
 
With these ingredients we follow three steps 
 
1) Calculate market equilibrium output given some fixed tax level T and fixed market price P.  
production cost distribution of  firms
survival criterion
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2) Calculate the cost of producing market equilibrium output. 
3) Calculate the cost of producing equilibrium output by the most efficient producers.  
 
Displacement deadweight loss is the difference between (2) and (3).  
 
The distribution function is our three-dimensional Figure 1(a), which can be represented in two-
dimensional form in Table (7) below. The numbers in the cells are the averages of firm answers to 
the question of the relative frequency of the joint distribution of productive efficiency and tax 
honesty. For example, the figure of 6.80 in the top-left cell indicates that on average respondents 
believed that 6.8% of firms in their industry placed in the category of having very low tax-honesty 
but very high productive efficiency.  
 
 Table 7:  Relationship Between Tax evasion and Production Efficiency 
  
 
PRODUCTION 
EFFICIENCY (A) 
very low  
(0.2) 
low  
(0.4) 
medium 
(0.6) 
high 
(0.8) 
very high 
(1.0) 
TOTAL 
very high (1) 6.80 2.37 2.93 1.11 4.48 17.70 High 
efficiency 
 high (0.8) 1.14 3.16 4.38 4.27 5.73 18.68 
⇓ medium (0.6) 1.99 1.40 15.39 4.11 4.82 27.72 
small (0.4) 0.05 2.88 5.04 4.50 2.72 15.20  
Low 
efficiency very low (0.2) 1.68 3.69 4.57 1.44 9.32 20.70 
TOTAL 11.66 13.51 32.32 15.43 27.09 100.00 
 TAX HONESTY (i)   
 Low honesty        ⇒           High honesty  
 
 
We assume perfectly elastic demand so we can fix price P at the arbitrary level of 2. Taxes are set 
at 1 so that the survival criterion line becomes A=(1+i)/2, which we represent in the coordinate 
system of Table 7 as a sloped line bisecting the matrix. Firms above the line are identified by 
shaded boxes, and these are the firms that survive. Firms below the line do not survive. Drawing 
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on the analogy with Figure 3 we can see that the number of firms who produce is the sum of 
frequencies in the shaded cells. To be explicit, supply under evasion is: 
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To measure displacement loss we need to compare the above costs to costs in a world which 
produces the same quantity but is free of tax evasion. To get these costs we simply add the costs of 
the most efficient firms that could produce 28.36. This cost comes to 31.03 and can be read off 
Table 7 by simply taking the most efficient 28.36% of firms and summing their costs. To be sure 
the method is clear first we sum the frequencies in the top row of Table 3 and multiply by costs. 
This gives 17.7*(1/1) because costs are 1/A and A for this row is 1. Then we take the difference 
between 28.36 and 17.7, which is 10.66, and multiply this by the costs of the firms in the row 
which is second from the top in Table 7. The costs in the row are 1/A, or 1/0.8=1.25. The total cost 
of the most efficient way of producing 28.36 are then  
 
 
03.31
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1
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The displacement loss is the percentage difference between costs under evasion and no evasion 
which comes to 2.7%. 
 
Table 8 measures the displacement loss for a variety of tax levels. Tax levels are, as before, unit 
taxes on capital and labour.  The table also measures tax revenues and displacement loss per unit 
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of tax dollar raised for each different tax level. This latter measure is analogous to the social 
opportunity cost of public funds discussed by Usher (1982).  
 
Table 8: Displacement loss and tax revenues for different levels of taxes 
Tax level 
Absolute 
displacement 
loss 
% Displacement 
loss 
Government tax 
revenue 
Displacement 
loss per dollar of 
tax revenue 
0.0 0.00 0.0% 0.00 0.00 
0.5 0.00 0.0% 11.83 0.00 
1.0 0.83 2.7% 13.95 0.06 
1.5 1.95 9.8% 14.21 0.14 
2.0 0.98 5.3% 11.91 0.08 
2.5 1.61 13.1% 7.34 0.22 
 
That government revenues rise and fall is due to the initially inelastic and then elastic contraction 
of supply in response to tax increases. This Laffer effect is of peripheral interest to the present 
paper. The rise, fall, and then rise in percentage displacement loss are due to the irregular 
disposition of firms on the matrix represented in Table 7 and Figure 7. Displacement loss as a 
percentage of the value of output is comparable to Harberger’s triangle calculations for the US. 
Displacement as a fraction of dollars raised in taxes is comparable to social opportunity cost of 
government funds presented by Usher (1982).  
 
6. Challenges to the analysis 
 
In the present paper we have asked three questions of increasing complexity. Increasing 
complexity opens our results to increasing chances of false inference. Our first query found that 
firms in the retail and construction sectors of the Czech Republic find that tax evaders may have an 
unfair advantage over non-evaders. Opinions were mixed on whether these evaders were of high or 
low productive efficiency. Our second query pushed the survey into a speculative terrain where 
firms were asked to fill out a 5X5 matrix so as to show how productive efficiency and tax honesty 
were distributed among twenty-five categories. Analysis of the matrix revealed a Spearman rank 
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correlation of 0.1673 and a Kendall tau-b of 0.1368, which suggested the possibility that 
displacement deadweight loss could be significantly above zero. The third part of the paper 
presented a formal theory of displacement deadweight loss and suggested that, under highly 
stylized assumptions about cost functions and taxes, industry displacement loss could be could be 
of the order of 2.7% to 13.1% of costs. In the present section we examine the bias and other 
challenges that may affect our answers. Some challenges we can counter. Others we have no 
immediate solutions to.  
 
6.1 Challenges arising from the survey 
 
As our first two answers were not based on formal theory, the potential error lies in answers to the 
survey. Three biases challenges present themselves: 
 
1) What do respondents understand by “tax evasion”? We asked respondents their opinions 
about tax evasion and accepted their answers without knowing what activities they had in 
mind when replying. If respondents had tax avoidance in mind when answering questions 
about tax evasion, survey answers may underestimate the gravity of displacement 
deadweight loss. A productive firm may hire the best tax consultants and so avoid, through 
creative accounting, the better part of its taxes. If respondents see this as tax evasion our 
survey will give the impression that the most productive firms are the most evasive. We 
might then draw the conclusion that there is less displacement deadweight loss than there is 
actually. Luckily, unanticipated information volunteered by respondents can address the 
above problem. Interviewers reported that outside the structure of the survey, most small 
firms said large firms engaged widely in legal “tax optimization”. Tax optimization is a 
direct translation from the Czech and means tax avoidance. Since smaller firms believed 
themselves not to have the option of access to expensive tax counseling services they 
viewed avoidance as evasion. This is evidence that our survey lead to an underestimation of 
DDL. 
 
2) How knowledgeable are respondents? It is difficult to ascertain how much would firm 
managers or owners know about other firms in their industry. For example, food retailing 
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has three major sectors: supermarkets, chain convenience stores, and corner grocers. How 
might a manager of a supermarket know about evasion in other sub-sectors of retail, and 
how might a grocery operator know about evasion by supermarkets? We are not sure that 
the above problem leads to bias in our answers. It will certainly contribute to noise in the 
answers. We speculate that firms are likely to know the conditions of their industry better 
than any other type of respondent. Firms that have survived “long enough” will know who 
their competitors are and will have an idea of why their competitors are successful. The 
first part of our survey asked firms whether they believed tax evaders could displace honest 
firms. The people best placed to answer this question are firms in the industry. Firms who 
have been around the longest will have the best knowledge of industry conditions. Future 
surveys might use only the answers of firms who have survived longer than the median 
number of years of survival in their industry. Future surveys might also try to find objective 
data on who are the evaders in each industry and use these true answers to test the 
knowledge of respondents. Respondents with a failing grade would be removed from the 
sample.  
3) How can you map qualitative answers onto a continuous scale? The 5X5 matrix we 
presented respondents does not ask for them to assign a precise value of A or I to firms but 
rather to categorize firms into twenty-five slots. How do we know what differing firms 
mean by high, low, or medium? Starting with Theil (1952) statisticians and economists 
have been devising methods to covert qualitative data into quantitative data. The literature 
surveys by Nardo (2003) and D’Elio (2005) underline three methods (probability, 
regression, latent factor) for transforming qualitative data. None of these methods is at 
present applicable to our paper because each relies was devised to forecast growth rates of 
a variable, such as inflation, from people’s assessment of whether the variable with rise, 
fall or stay constant. The methods rely on a time series of answers that draw on revealed 
quantities from the past to convert current qualitative answers into quantitative answers. 
There is an outside chance of applying the probability method to our analysis, but such an 
application would be burdened by questionable assumptions about the indifference range of 
quantities that respondents identify with a category, and about the distribution of the 
quantities underlying the qualitative answers. When confronted with ambiguous data, the 
procedure in simulations is to carry out the simulations by varying assumptions. A glance 
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at Table 7 shows that we assumed an answer placing a firm in the upper left cell of the 
table gave that firm (A=1, i=0.2), in other words, we assumed that respondents had an A of 
one and an i of 0.2 in mind when thinking of a firm as highly efficient but also very 
dishonest. We could also have assumed a firm had the mid-point of each cell in mind, so 
that the upper left cell would correspond to values of (A=0.9, i=0.1), and similarly for all 
other cells. In simulations shown here we found our measures of DDL did not changed by 
several percent but remained within the same order of magnitude, which indicates a certain 
robustness of result.  
 
6.1 Challenges to the theory 
 
Our treatment of the theory of displacement loss has been cursory because, in part, much of this 
theory already has been developed in earlier work by Palda. What one will not find in Palda are the 
following problems that have to do with the intersection of theory and measurement: 
 
1) Why not model the firm’s decision to evade? In the present paper we simply assumed a 
continuum of firms having what we casually referred to as differing levels of tax honesty. 
We summarized these evasive abilities in a single random variable i and by so doing 
ignored all modeling on the decision to evade that has appeared since Allingham and 
Sandmo’s (1972) pioneering work. Instead, we could have endogenized evasion by 
postulating each firm’s evasive decision function. The solved-out decision function of the 
firm could then be used to identify relevant parameters to estimate from a firm survey and 
the form in which these estimates must be cast to calculate displacement loss. It might 
appear that a model of a firm’s decision to evade would endogenize the i parameter and 
lead to a deterministic relation between a firm’s productive ability, its aversion to risk, and 
its innate talents for hiding from the revenue service and by so doing would do away with 
the need to estimate distributions of evasive and productive abilities. Such a model would 
no doubt endogenize the evasive decision of each firm but firms would still differ in their 
aversion to risk, their raw abilities to evade, and their productive abilities. An equilibrium 
model based on individual firm choices would still leave us with a randomly assigned 
honesty index i, with the only difference from the present discussion being that this random 
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variable would itself be the function of other random variables such as firm preference 
parameters and firm abilities to evade taxes. The value of modeling firm decisions is that it 
would give testable hypotheses about the joint distribution of A and i. As we have 
emphasized, we are not seeking to test hypotheses. We are searching for a joint distribution 
between A and i, and as we are not setting out to test hypotheses about this joint 
distribution, but rather to use it in calculations, we have no need to model i.   
2) Exactly what distribution are firms giving us? The astute reader will notice a quandary in 
our formulation of the joint distribution function of firms. We asked existing firms to 
comment on their view of the market as it is. Our theory postulates a distribution over 
existing and potential firms. Nothing says that the existing distribution is the same as the 
potential distribution. Our analysis assumes both distributions to be the same. This will be 
the case if the normalized distribution of A-i of those remaining is identical to the 
distribution over potential firms.  If the normalized distribution is not the same then we can 
say little of how our results would differ from the true results.  
3) Constant production by each firm. Some readers will not like the assumption that all firms 
produce dq.  One main channel by which the underground economy might lower efficiency 
might be by inducing firms to remain suboptimally small in a world of increasing returns to 
scale so as to avoid coming to the attention of the tax authorities. While it would be 
possible to model this particular deadweight cost of tax evasion by using a non-linear cost 
of avoidance that does not rely on the ad hoc assumptions about correlations, such 
modeling would be addressing not displacement loss, but the loss from staying 
suboptimally small. While we did not model the above case, Palda (2001b) modeled 
displacement loss when firms can vary their outputs and evasive and productive talents 
follow a normal distribution. He found the theoretical estimates of displacement loss to be 
very similar to the case of fixed firm output.  
4) Arbitrariness of taxes and cost function. We used a Cobb-Douglas production function to 
derive costs under particular assumptions about wages, rents, returns to scale and the tax 
system (an equal tax on the quantity of labour and capital used). These assumptions 
produced a straight firm “decision wall.” By postulating other cost functions we would 
have obtained different decision walls (some non-linear) and so different initial equilibrium 
levels of production and DDL. For reasons of space and exposition we cannot discuss how 
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our results vary with different costs and tax functions. Our main objective was to show how 
such calculations may be done.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We have asked whether displacement deadweight loss is a topic worthy of study alongside other 
deadweight losses that arise from tax evasion. To answer this question we first surveyed firms 
about what they think of tax evaders in their industry. A majority of firms believed evaders stole 
business from them. Roughly half our respondents thought that evaders were also less efficient 
than non-evaders. These answers gave some support to our notion that firms with poor productive 
abilities but a willingness or ability to evade taxes (which we called tax honesty) can oust from the 
market more efficient, more honest firms. We deepened our analysis by asking firms questions that 
allowed us to calculate the correlation between efficiency and tax honesty to be above zero. As 
Palda showed theoretically (1998, 2001a) and by simulation (2001b) a positive correlation 
produces a significant DDL. Our final step was to apply Palda’s model to our data on the joint 
distribution of efficiency and tax honesty in order to calculate DDL. We found that a DDL 
comparable to the measures of deadweight loss calculated by Alm (1985).  
 
It is difficult to end an article in public finance without claiming that one’s analysis has important 
policy conclusions. We avoid applying our finding to policy because we have not addressed 
deadweight loss from taxation in its totality. What matters for policy is the marginal cost of raising 
an extra dollar of tax income. DDL adds to the total cost, but attacking DDL may change the 
marginal cost in a surprising way. Palda (2001b) showed that the maximum possible of 
government revenues might be higher with tax evasion than without it provided there was a strong 
positive relation between efficiency and honesty. Evasion in such a case allows government to tax 
discriminate in such a way that firms pay according to their abilities to pay. Reducing tax evasion 
would then reduce government revenues without necessarily reducing traditional triangle 
deadweight loss. The final effect of the fight on evasion might then be to raise the marginal cost of 
public funds. Policy conclusions will have to wait until the arrival of a model that considers both 
triangle and displacement deadweight losses, as well as of surveys that can satisfactorily overcome 
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some of the challenges mentioned earlier. For the moment, we are satisfied to have pointed out a 
field where further research might be necessary.  
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